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Introduction 
Young people in England today spend more time in education and gain higher qualifications 
than their parents did. Twice as many continue in upper secondary education and training and 
fifty percent more gain degrees than did so the 1980s. Whilst for several decades - from the 
1960s to the late 1980s - the UK lagged far behind most OECD states in educational 
participation after lower secondary school (Green, 1990; IMS, 1984), over the past generation 
the gap has closed substantially. Although early school leaving still remains somewhat higher 
than in many OECD countries, the UK has now championed ‘lifelong learning’ and become 
more like the ‘learning society’ advocated in so many of the reports from the OECD and the 
European Commission in the years after 1980s surge in the global ‘knowledge economy’. 
(Green, 2000, 2003; OECD, 1996; European Commission, 1995; 2001).    
This historic rise in participation was encouraged by governments exorting young people to aim 
higher in education and by the provision  a wider range of education and training opportunities 
for them to do so. ‘Education, Education, Education’ was Tony Blair’s mantra in Labour’s 
successful 1997 election campaign and a leitmotif of his three governments thereafter, and 
governments since the 1990s had been conveying similar messages. But it was also a 
consequence of the growing demand for education and qualifications from young people 
themselves. With the rise of the so-called global ‘knowledge economy’ since the 1980s, it was 
becoming increasingly evident that western countries could only hope to maintain their 
economic competitiveness and living standards in the face of low wage competition in 
developing countries if they shifted their economies towards the high value sectors of 
production and services (Brown et al, 2001). That meant competing through innovation and 
productivity gains based on high-skilled work.  Employers were out-sourcing low-skilled work 
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to lower wage countries or keeping the low skill jobs at home at lower wage rates, but demand 
was high for well qualified school leavers and graduates. For young people born after 1980 the 
message was clear – if you want a decent job you have to get higher qualifications. Most have 
responded accordingly and we now have the most qualified generation of young people in 
history.  
But how far does this increasing credentialisation of young people and jobs represent a genuine 
inter-generational gain in opportunities in - and through - education? Politicians have remained 
relentlessly upbeat about the benefits of education, and policies to expand education have 
always, of course, been electorally popular. But many academic and media commentators have 
been less optimistic about what it all means. In a now familiar set of tropes describing today’s 
youth, the media constantly refer to a ‘lost generation’ or more provocatively to ‘generation 
rent’ and the ‘jilted generation’ (Howker and Malik,  2013). Many academic commentators have 
been equally skeptical about benefits of educational expansion. Allen and Ainley (2010), for 
instance, have argued that educational expansion has just led to credential inflation for a 
generation which now has ‘education without jobs’. Brown et al (2012), looking more widely 
at the changes in global labour markets and the ‘global auction of talent’, argue that western 
governments have sold a false prospectus to workers and particularly to young people. They 
contend that with the exponential increases in the output of graduates from fast developing 
countries, particularly in East Asia, western economies are unlikely to be able to retain their 
global economic competitiveness through leading in skills, knowledge and innovation. Much 
more likely, they say, is that the rising world output of high skills in a globalised labour market, 
and a trend towards the ‘digitalisation’ of professional jobs, will lead to diminished 
opportunities for western graduates and a continuing downward pressure on graduate pay. The 
era of the high skill low wage job, they say is already at hand.  The prospectus sold to young 
people will turn out to be no more than ‘broken promises.’   
In this article we explore these issues of rising qualifications and the implication for life 
opportunities in more depth, drawing on a range of sources. We use quantitative data from 
various existing datasets on trends in participation, qualifications and skills, to assess just what 
the expansion in educational participation means in terms of inter-generation changes in 
opportunities.  
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We find that increasing rates of participation in post 16 education and training in England has 
indeed led to a substantial rise in qualification levels for the current generation of youth 
compared their parents’ generation. More inclusive participation has also narrowed inequalities 
in qualification outcomes and slightly reduced the social gaps in attainment of qualifications, at 
least at the upper secondary level. We live in a more open educational environment where 
aspirations are less constrained by norms associated with gender and social class.  
However, the gains in educational opportunities for young people are to some extent illusory. 
Improvements in the skills we can measure, like literacy and numeracy, have not kept pace with 
increasing qualifications rates, and inequalities in skills have reduced much less than those in 
qualifications, if at all. This suggests that much of rise in qualifications is indeed a question of 
credential inflation and yields few benefits to young people today in terms of future life 
prospects. Indeed our analysis of the occupational destinations of people qualified at different 
levels suggests a steady erosion of the value of qualifications of all levels on the labour market. 
At the same time career opportunities for young women have generally improved and, arguably, 
for most young people there is a sense that they are freer to aspire then was the case for their 
parents.  
The first section of this article examines the quantitative evidence on increases in educational 
participation and qualification at the upper secondary and higher education levels and what this 
means in terms of the levels of skills of the recent generations of young people entering the 
labour market. We look at how this expansion in participation has affected inequalities in 
educational attainment (qualifications) and achievement (skills), both in terms of the changes in 
the distributions of qualification levels and skills and in terms of the social gaps (measures in 
terms of the effects of social background) on attainment and achievement. The final part of the 
first section considers the changes in skills inequalities that have occurred over time and during 
the youth transition phase between 15 and 27 years of age. In the second section we consider 
the evolution of post-16 pathways in education and training since the 1980, the current shape 
and characteristics of these pathways, and the labour market destination of students from 
different pathways. We turn finally to the question of how far the educational expansion since 
the 1980s represents an improvement in educational opportunities for the current generation of 
youth compared to their parents’ generation who went though the education system some thirty 
years before.  
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Education Expansion and Changes in Educational Attainment and 
Achievement 
Our analysis of changes in education and skills levels over time and over the life course draws 
on data from four main sources. The OECD Survey of Adult Skills conducted in 24 countries 
and country regions (including for the UK, England and Northern Ireland) in 2011/12 is a cross 
sectional household survey, which includes data for a representative sample of individuals aged 
16-65 on their qualification levels and tested skills in numeracy, literacy and problem solving, 
as well as on their highest qualification level and those of their parents (OECD, 2013b). The 
data allow us to compare the levels and distributions of qualifications and skills for different 
age groups as they were in 2011/2012. Given that most qualifications are attained before the age 
of 25, we can also make inferences about the trends in the output of qualifications over the 
periods when different age groups experienced post-16 education and training. We cannot know 
from this cross-sectional survey how individuals skills have changed over the life course, and 
cannot separate out how far differences between age groups are due to cohort (and period) 
effects or to life course effects. However, by analysing the SAS data in conjunction with the 
data on literacy in the OECD’s predecessor skills survey (International Survey of Adult Literacy 
Skills - IALS), which was conducted in the mid 1990s, we can make some assessments of both 
life course changes in skills, by comparing skills of pseudo cohorts at the time of each survey, 
and of trends, by comparing the same age group in each survey. Data on the trends in 
occupational destinations of people qualified to different levels is taken from the time series 
data in the UK Labour Force Surveys.   
Increasing participation in upper secondary and higher education 
Participation, both in upper secondary education and training and in higher education, has 
increased somewhat unevenly since the 1980s, but the net change represents a significant rise 
in number of years that young people spend in initial formal education and training. Participation 
in full-time education at 17 -  the age at which the majority in England complete upper secondary 
education - has more than doubled over the past 30 years, rising from around 27 percent in 1980  
to 67 percent in 2008 (Bolton, 2012). On Department for Education (DFE) estimates for 2014, 
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only around nine percent of 17 year olds in England were not participating in some kind of full 
or part-time education or training (DFE, 2015).  During the course of 30 years upper secondary 
education and training had changed from what was a previously a minority affair to being a 
phase of education experienced by almost everyone, albeit for variables lengths of time.  
Increases in tertiary education participation have been almost as impressive. Of the generation 
born between 1963 and 1972, who would have been of tertiary education age in the 1980s, 30 
percent achieved tertiary qualifications. Of the later generation born between 1986 – 1995, who 
were of tertiary education age in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 47 percent achieved tertiary 
qualifications, an increase of 46 percent over 20 years. Participation rates would have been even 
higher since a small proportion do not complete.1 Overall participation rates in tertiary education 
by now are even higher – approaching 50 percent. 
Staying on in education and training after lower secondary school has been encouraged since 
the late 1970s by a number of policy interventions. During the late 1970s and the 1980s a range 
of new youth training programmes for 16-19 year olds were introduced to deal with the then 
high rates of school leaver unemployment. The Manpower Services Commission (a government 
quango) brought in the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) in 1978 and replaced this with 
the more ambitious Youth Training Scheme (YTS) in 1983. These schemes were on a large 
scale, with the YTS alone recruiting 400 000 16-18 year olds in its first year of operation, 
representing almost a fifth of the cohort (Mizen, 1990, p. 23). In 1988 the Government 
introduced the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) to replace the formerly 
divided qualification system, combining ‘O’ levels and CSEs, with a single integrated 
examination at the end of lower secondary education. With more assessment by coursework, 
and lacking the stigma attached to the old CSE exams, the GCSE became popular with students, 
teachers and parents and is often given the credit for raising the confidence of lower academic 
attainers and thus encouraging more of these to stay on in education (Raffe et al, 2001).  
Further changes in the qualifications offer came in 1993 with the introduction of General 
National Vocational Qualifications (GNVQ) at Foundation, Intermediate and Advanced levels, 
                                                          
1 Data source: For 2000s, data are from Education at a Glance (OECD, 2013:37) Table A1.3a; For 1980s, data 
are from Education at a Glance (OECD, 2010:36) Table A1. 3a. The OECD give us tertiary graduation rate for 
the UK in 2010 as 60% but this is calculated yusing a different methodology from the pre-2005 series.  
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the latter two nominally equivalent to GCSEs and ‘A’ levels respectively. These were broad 
vocational courses, organised on a flexible modular basis, with additional core skills, and 
offering a vocational alternative to the established academic pathway with the potential for 
progression to higher education. As such they were widely adopted in colleges, which recruited 
some 250 000 participating students in 1994/5, before they were phased out in 1997 and replaced 
by new vocational GCSEs and A levels. The Education Maintenance Allowance, introduced by 
the Labour Government in 2001, provided financial assistance to 16-19 years olds from lower 
income families to undertake education and training. This probably also contributed to rising 
participation until it was abolished for most young people in England in 2010.2  Most recently 
there has been the raising of the participation age which from 2014 required school leavers to 
continue in some form of full- or part- time education or training until their eighteenth birthday.   
Each of these measures has no doubt contributed something towards the large increases in 
participation seen during the past thirty years. However, the primary factor which drove 
expansion was the increasing demand from parents and students for ever higher levels of 
qualification in response to the global changes occurring in labour markets. In the 1970s and 
1980s early school leavers still had a reasonable chance, at least outside of periods of recession, 
of securing work in one of the many occupations which did not require qualifications for entry 
– or at least nothing more than a few O levels. By the 21st century it was clear to young people 
that there would be very few opportunities available for securing decent jobs if they failed to 
achieve an upper secondary (level three) qualification. With the decline of skilled work, and the 
downward pressure on wages in unskilled work resulting from global economic competition 
(Thurrow, 1996), the available jobs for the low skilled young were increasingly hard to find, 
and if secured tended to be poorly paid, with limited career prospects, and were, above all, 
highly precarious. Many of these were part-time, or increasingly on fixed term contracts or 
contracts without guaranteed weekly hours (Zero hours contracts) (Standing, 2011). 
Governments from the late 1990s onwards repeatedly stressed that young people must gain 
higher qualifications to compete in the new global knowledge economy, and young people took 
the message. In the main it was demand driving supply rather than the other way around. This 
was even more apparent in higher education, where demand for places increased steadily, even 
                                                          
2 Research from the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) suggested that  in 56 of the 150 Local Education authorities 
where they were pilotted the EMA increased participation amongst eleigible groups by 5.9%. See BBC: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/3638739.stm 
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in the face of the barriers imposed by new policies on tuition fees. Credentialism came late to 
England (Green, 1990) but was clearly here to stay.  
Increasing in Average Qualification Levels at GCSE, Upper Secondary and Degree level.  
The massification of upper secondary and higher education has inevitably increased the 
qualification levels of young people today compared with those of their parents’ generation. 
Qualification rates have risen at each level of education, as have the highest qualifications held 
by each successive generation. Figure 1 shows the trend in highest qualification levels by 
cohorts, using the SAS data for 2011/12.3  Qualifications are classified according to the ISCED 
– 97  classification system (OECD, 2010), where a level 5 or above qualification is a bachelor 
degree or higher, a level 4 qualification a sub-degree or technician level qualification, and a full 
level 3 qualification is taken to be one achieved through an upper secondary programmes of two 
or more years.4 Level two qualification are those pertaining to the completion of lower 
secondary education.  
The proportion gaining a highest qualification at bachelor degree level or above increased the 
most, rising from 32 percent in the parental generation to about 46 percent in the children’s 
generation (based on 25-29 cohort). The proportion whose highest qualifications were at level 
2 or below reduced from 10 percent in the 50-54 cohort to around 8 percent in the 25-29 cohort. 
The proportion gaining a highest qualification at level 3 or 4 has declined from 21 percent in 
the 50-54 cohort to 19 percent in the 25-29 cohort, reflecting the growing number of those 
gaining level three who go on to achieve a higher level qualification. However, the proportion 
gaining a level three or higher qualification has increased substantially, from 53 percent to 65 
percent. Given that some of the highest qualifications held by the 50-54 age group were obtained 
                                                          
3 The cohort aged 50 – 54 in 2011/12 are taken as the best proxy for the parents of the CELS generation. The 20-
24 age group are the best proxy for the CELS generation who were around 20 in 2011/12, but these have not all 
yet obtained their highest qualification, so we also look at the older 25-29 cohort who, for the most part, have. 
4 OECD reporting assigns qualifications to ISCED levels according to the attributions made by country 
authorities. We exclude from level 3 those whose highest qualification has classified as ISCED 3C (≥2), since 
this  category includes many qualifications, like GCSEs, GNVQ Intermediate, BTEC First, NVQ 2 and City and 
Guilds Level 2, which can either be taken during lower secondary education, or require less than two years of full 
upper secondary education.  For other countries in the survey, qualifications classified to ISEC 3 C (≥2) include 
only those for which the earliest age of completion is 17 or 18 years, whereas for England the minimum age at 
which the above qualification can be gained is noted (correctly) as 16 years.  
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later in life, this somewhat understates the difference in attainment rates of those young people 
going through post-16 education and training in the early 1980s and in the late 2000s.  
 
Figure One 
 
Source: Own derivation from OECD (2013b). Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult Skill. 
OECD, Paris. Data for England and Northern Ireland.  
 
Trends in Levels of Knowledge and Skill  
How far these increases in participation and qualification rates represent genuine improvements 
in levels of knowledge and skill amongst young people remains a moot point. Many would argue 
that what we have observed is little more than credential inflation, with much of the gain in 
qualification rates being attributable to examinations becoming easier (Wolf, 2015; Sullivan et 
al, 2011). While this may be the case it is almost impossible to verify since the content of 
examinations has changed over time, along with assessment methodology – in most cases with 
the latter moving from norm-referenced to criterion-based assessment. Less easily refuted is the 
claim that levels literacy and numeracy competence have not improved in line with higher 
qualification rates.  
 
Figure Two 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
ISCED 1 or below ISCED 2 ISCED 3-4 ISCED 5 and above
Highest Qualifications by Age Cohort
20-24 25-29 50-54
 9 
National Averages of 15-Year-Old Students’ Mathematics Achievement 
Measured by PISA between 2000 and 2012 
 
PISA tests of 15 year olds show no improvement in numeracy skills in England during the 12 
years from 2000. In fact there appears to have been a decline during 2000 – 2006 and little 
change thereafter. Even if we discount the first two waves, on the basis that skewed samples 
inflated the mean test scores, there is still no significant improvement over the years from 2006 
to 2012. As Figure 2 shows, performance in numeracy amongst 15 year olds in England flat-
lined from 2006, while in several other countries adopting similar market-oriented education 
policies tests showed continuous declines through the entire 12 year period (Sahlberg, 2012). 
Figure Three 
 
Source: Own derivation from OECD (2013b). Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult 
Skill. OECD, Paris.  
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We only have PISA test score data from 2000, and so cannot compare the performance of the 
current generation with that of their parent’s generation.  However, OECD tests of literacy and 
numeracy conducted in 2011/12 (SAS) and the 1996 (IALS) do allow some comparison between 
generations and they show no changes in skills levels at all. As Figures 3 and 4 show, young 
people in England scored on average relatively poorly compared with those in other countries, 
and, mean literacy and numeracy scores for the 16-24 age group were no better than those for 
the  55-64 year olds.    
 
Figure Four 
 
Source: Own derivation from OECD (2013b). Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult 
Skill. OECD, Paris.  
 
It may be objected that those in the older age group may have improved  their skills during their 
life course – and there is some evidence for this in England in early middle age (Green, Green 
and Pensiero, 2015) – and that they may have been less skilled than the younger age group when 
they were 16-24.  However, a comparison of the average levels of literacy skills of young people 
in IALS, conducted in 1996 and SAS, conducted in 2011/12, shows no significant changes over 
time.  The mean test score of 16-24s was 273 in IALS and 265 in SAS. The mean test score of 
25 – 34s were slightly higher, at 277 in IALS and 280 in SAS. But neither change is statistically 
significant (BIS, 2013, p. 154).  
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Furthermore, the analysis conducted by NFER for BIS (BIS, 2014) shows that the mean literacy 
scores were lower in SAS than the IALS at each education level. Respondents of all ages with 
university level education had mean literacy scores of 308 in IALS in 1996 and 294 in SAS in 
2011; those with ‘full secondary education’ scored on average 282 in IALS and 268 in SAS;5 
those with three years or less of secondary education scored on average 249 in IALS and 224 in 
SAS (BIS, 2013, p. 157). The full 16-64 year old sample is considered in the comparison so 
respondents in each test with different levels of qualification would have gained their 
qualifications at different historical times. However, assuming qualifications were acquired at 
similar ages at the time of the two surveys, and given that SAS was conducted 15/16 years later 
than IALS, the qualifications recorded in SAS were on average gained some fifteen years later 
than those in IALS. If people at any given level of qualification score lower on average in the 
literacy tests in SAS than IALS, this strongly suggests that literacy competence has declined 
over time at that level.  
Declines in Educational Inequalities? 
A further case that is made for the increase in educational opportunities over time, both in 
England and in other developed countries, is that inequalities in attainment (qualifications 
gained) has reduced, both in terms of a narrowing in the distributions (equality of outcomes) 
and a reduction in the effects of social background on educational attainment (equality of 
opportunity). The literature on the subject is large and complex, and at times contradictory, and 
results depend somewhat on the measures used, but the balance of studies confirm declines in 
inequality in most developed countries, at least over the decades since the 1950s. Thomas, Wang 
and Fang (2000), using data on years of schooling for 85 countries from 1960 – 1990, found a 
decline for most countries in the Gini measure of inequality in educational outcomes. Meschi 
and Scervini (2012), using a variety of data sets going back over 70 years, observe a  Kuznets 
type inverted U curve pattern over time with inequalities in educational outcomes tending to 
rise with initial educational expansion and declining slightly thereafter. In terms of social origins 
effects on educational outcomes, although some older studies (Shavitz and Blossfeld, 1993) 
found evidence for a number of countries of persistent inequalities in educational opportunities, 
                                                          
5 The sharp decline between IALS and SAS  in the scores of those with ‘full secondary education’ can be partly 
accounted for by the fact that those with GCSE A-C grades were assigned to ISCED 2 in IALS (here lower 
secondary) and to ISCED 3 (here full secondary)  in SAS.  
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more recent studies (Ballarino et al, 2009; 2014; Breen et al, 2009) have pointed towards small 
declines in social background effects in most countries, particularly at the upper secondary level.   
For England, a recent analysis by Sullivan et al. (2011), using Youth Cohort Study data for the 
years between 1990 and 2006, finds declining social gaps in participation at the upper secondary 
level, as well as reductions in social background effects on attainment. The proportion of places 
on A and AS level courses going to students from working-class backgrounds increased between 
1993 and 2006 from 17 to 20 percent for girls and from 14 to 17 percent for boys. They are not 
able to provide evidence on social gaps in attainment at A level, but show substantial declines 
in social background effects on overall GCSE performance, based on a GCSE points score 
measure and the position of students from different social backgrounds in the distribution. They 
find that the chances of working-class boys relative to middle-class boys being in the bottom 
third of the distribution declined from 2.3 to 1.9 between 1990 and 2003. The odds ratios for 
working-class girls of being in the bottom third declined from 2.6 to 2.4 over the same period.   
Inequalities in educational attainments, at least at the upper secondary level, do seem to have 
reduced in England over the past 40 years, both in terms of outcomes and opportunities. But the 
narrowing of the distribution of qualifications across all levels appears to have declined rather 
less than in many other OECD countries. Comparing the across cohorts, using the SAS data, 
allows proximate comparison of changes in inequalities over time across 24 OECD countries 
and country regions. Overall inequalities in educational attainment can be measured using 
education level Gini Coefficients for the distribution of highest qualifications (by ISCED 
levels). As Green et al (2015) show (see figure 5) there is a marked narrowing in most countries 
of the distribution of education levels (by highest qualification) between each of the ten year 
cohort from the 55-65 years olds to 25 to 34 year olds. Given that the majority of qualification 
are gained before the age of 25, this suggests a marked reduction in inequality of educational 
outcomes between the 1970s, when most of the older cohort would have gained their highest 
qualification, and the 2000s, when the younger cohort would have gained theirs. However, 
inequality in attainments for the youngest age group, and several older age groups, is higher in 
England than in most other countries and the reduction in inequality across the cohorts is rather 
less than in a number of countries, including particularly the historically less affluent countries 
(such as Cyprus, Korea Finland, Ireland, Norther Ireland and Spain) in which educational 
expansion has probably been more rapid over the period.  
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Figure Five 
 
Source: Own derivation from OECD (2013b). Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult 
Skill. OECD, Paris.  
 
We can also use the SAS data to compare the changes across cohorts in inequalities of 
opportunity at the higher education level. Figure 6 gives the odds ratio of gaining a degree 
between children of graduate parents and children of non-graduate parents for each cohort and 
across countries. Most countries show very large declines through the cohorts in the relative 
probabilities of children from more and less educated backgrounds gaining degrees. However, 
in a few countries, including England, Germany, the US, the social gaps in higher education 
attainment change very little between the 55+ cohort and the 25-34 cohort. The pattern in 
England seems to represent a traditional inverted U curve with inequalities of opportunity rising 
sharply during the early years of expansion, between the 55-64 cohort (graduating in 1970s)  
and the 35 to 44 year old cohort (graduating in the 1990s), and then returning to the original 
level with the 25-34 cohort (graduating in the 2000).  
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Figure Six 
Probability of Gaining HE Degree of Children of Graduate Parents Compared with those 
of Non-Graduate Parents (Odds Ratios) by Age Cohort 
 
Source: Own derivation from OECD (2013b). Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult 
Skill. OECD, Paris.  
 
Trends in Skills Inequalities 
The expansion in education participation has led to higher average levels of educational 
attainment and a reduction in inequalities of educational attainment, at least at the upper 
secondary level. We have seen that the distribution of highest levels of educational 
qualifications has narrowed and the effects of social background on attainment at GCSE level 
has reduced over time. However, some of these changes may be due largely to credential 
inflation. More people get qualifications at any given level because these are easier to get than 
they used to be. Because attainment at each level is more inclusive, there appears to have been 
a significant decline in inequalities in educational attainment below degree level. If we look at 
the trends in skills inequalities we may get a somewhat different picture of what has happened. 
At age 15 there has been a slight narrowing of the distribution of scores for literacy and 
numeracy across the OECD countries generally. Comparison of the PISA numeracy tests in 
2003 and 2009, shows a slight overall narrowing of the distribution across the OECD (Table 
11.2.8b OECD, 2013b, p. 201). At the same time there was a small increase in the slope of the 
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social gradient. Unfortunately, the UK is absent from the analysis, so we need to rely instead on 
the data in SAS and IALSs for England.  
Figure Seven: Numeracy Ginis for Younger and Older Age Groups 
 
Source: Own derivation from OECD (2013b). Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult 
Skill. OECD, Paris.  
 
The SAS data in Figures 7 and 8 show that skills distributions for England in both literacy and 
numeracy were slightly wider amongst 25-29 year olds than amongst 55-65 year olds, but this 
may be explained partly by a narrowing in skills distributions during the middle years of the life 
course in countries with exceptionally unequal skills (see Green, Green, and Pensiero, 2014).  
Figure Eight: Literacy Ginis for younger and Older Age Groups 
 
Source: Own derivation from OECD (2013b). Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult 
Skill. OECD, Paris.  
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The best evidence we have on the trends in skills distribution amongst young people is from a 
comparison between skills distribution for literacy in IALS, conducted in 1996 and SAS, 
conducted in 2011/12. What this shows is a very slight narrowing of the distribution for 16-24s 
in England during the period from 1996 to 2011. However, literacy skills in England were still 
more widely distributed than in any of the other OECD countries in both IALS and SAS surveys. 
Figure Nine: Literacy Ginis for 16-24 Year Olds in IALS and SAS 
 
Source: Green, Green and Pensiero, 2014.  
Figure 10 
Source: Own derivation from OECD (2013b). Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult 
Skill. OECD, Paris.  
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
GiniL1624 GiniIALS_L1624
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ja
p
an
K
o
re
a
C
yp
ru
s
Sp
ai
n
R
u
ss
ia
n
…
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s
C
an
ad
a…
Ir
el
an
d
Es
to
n
ia
Sw
ed
en
C
an
ad
a…
It
al
y
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s
D
en
m
ar
k
Fr
an
ce
N
o
rw
ay
A
u
st
ri
a
Fl
an
d
e
rs
…
G
e
rm
an
y
Fi
n
la
n
d
P
o
la
n
d
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
N
o
rt
h
er
n
…
En
gl
an
d
 (
U
K
)
Sl
o
va
k…
En
g/
U
S
Li
b
e
ra
l
C
EE
So
ci
al
 M
ar
ke
t
N
o
rd
ic
So
u
th
er
n
…
Ea
st
 A
si
an
Social Gradients for Numeracy for Younger and Older Age 
Groups
16-24 55-65
 17 
The trend in social background effects on skills, however, is much more negative in England. 
As figures 10 and 11 show, the social gradients of numeracy and literacy skills are much steeper 
amongst young people (aged 16-24s) than older people (aged 55+) according to analysis of the 
SAS data (Green and Pensiero, 2015). Again some of this difference may be due to a decline in 
the social gaps in skills over the life course which we are unable to verify. But this seems 
unlikely to account for an increase in the social gap in scores in numeracy of the magnitude we 
see for England where the difference between the mean scores of respondents with graduate 
parents and those with non-gradate parents increases from 39 points in the 55+ generation to 67 
points in the 16-24 generation.  
Figure Eleven 
 
Source: Own derivation from OECD (2013b). Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult 
Skill. OECD, Paris.  
 
Explaining the Trends in Skills Inequalities 
The evidence on trends in skills inequalities in England presents a much less sanguine picture 
of declining inequalities than we get from looking at qualification levels. Whilst the latter 
suggests a significant reduction in inequalities of opportunities and outcomes, particularly at the 
upper secondary level, the skills evidence suggests that inequality of opportunity in skills has 
risen, even if there has been a slight narrowing in the skills distribution for young people over 
time. In many ways this conforms better to the dominant theories that seek to explain trends in 
educational inequalities.  
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According to Raymond Boudon’s (1974) influential ‘positional’ theory, social inequalities in 
education are reproduced in two ways which he refers to as the primary and secondary effects 
of social stratification. Primary effects occur as a result of the transmission of cultural capital 
within the family, so that children who experience high levels of cultural capital at home achieve 
better in schools that value the same forms of cultural capital. Secondary effects occur as a result 
of children from different backgrounds making different choices within the education system, 
whereby children from higher status families, for instance, are more likely to choose pathways 
that lead to higher status qualifications, even when they are the same level of tested achievement. 
The first process tends to occur, arguably, in a similar way in all societies and education systems 
(Jackson, 2013). However, the second process may be more conditional on the nature of the 
particular education system. As Boudon cogently argued, in societies structured by class and 
other inequalities, the greater the variety of different routes through the education system—i.e. 
the more ‘branching-off’ points—the greater the likelihood that socially differentiated 
aspirations and expectations, engendered from outside the education system, will structure 
student choices, even in a situation of ostensibly meritocratic access, so that educational 
opportunities and outcomes will be structured along class, race and gender lines. 
 
In more recently elaborated theories of ‘persistent inequalities’ in education, elite social 
groups maintain their educational advantages as education systems expand in two ways. 
According to the theory of Maximally Maintained Inequality (MMI) (Raftery and Hout, 
1993), as a phase of the education systems expands, higher social groups can maintain their 
advantage so long as their participation in that phase of education grows as fast as, or faster 
than that of lower social groups. However, when participation by elite students reaches 
saturation levels, participation rates for children from lower social groups catch up, thus 
equalising opportunities at that level. Positional competition by social groups then tends 
to shift to higher levels of education. At the same time, according to the Effectively 
Maintained Inequality (EMI) theory (Lucas, 2001), mass provision at the lower level 
develops more differentiated pathways, increasingly organised into a status hierarchy, with 
elite students tending to colonise the most prestigious tracks with the best progression 
routes to higher levels of  education. 
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Both of these processes can be identified in the evolution of further and higher education 
in England. As rises in participation in further education since the 1980s have led to near 
universal participation by the 2000s, social gaps in participation have declined and 
positional competition has focussed increasingly on higher education, thus driving rising 
enrolments there. The equalisation of participation in upper secondary education and 
training has reduced inequalities in educational qualifications at that level, while elites 
have maintained their advantages at the higher education level. This has most likely been 
achieved through the processes described in Effectively Maintained Inequality Theory 
whereby as each level has expanded it has become increasingly differentiated into multiple 
pathways defined in a status hierarchy, with elite groups dominating the highest status 
pathways that provide access to the best opportunities at the higher level. The process has 
been very evident in the development of upper secondary education and training in 
England over the past 40 years.  
 
During the 1970s, when barely a third of young people stayed on in education and training 
after 15/16, there were just two main pathways. One was the A level studies in the Sixth 
Form or Sixth Form College which constituted the ‘royal road’ to higher education. The 
other was the vocational route, consisting then mainly of craft apprenticeships which, 
before their decline in the mid 1970s, enrolled up to a third of working-class boys, but very 
few girls.  Both pathways had relatively clear progression routes and predictable future 
opportunities in the labour market. With the expansion of participation since the late 1970s 
there has been a proliferation of new programmes and qualifications of very unequal 
duration and status and with very different prospects in terms of progression to higher 
levels education and training or into the labour market. A similar diversification of 
pathways has been observed at the higher education level, not only with the status 
distinctions between institutions - such as between those belonging, respectively, to the 
Russel Group, the 94 Group, and the Local Million Plus Group - but also between students 
studying full- and part- time, and those studying at the local institution and those going 
away from home to university (Allen and Ainley, 2010). In the face of the great diversity 
of qualifications, national qualification frameworks have been adopted to establish 
equivalences between academic and vocational qualifications at different levels, and 
university first degrees are all theoretically equivalent. This has contributed towards an 
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apparent equalisation of attainment at different levels. However, it disguises the fact that 
in terms of measured skills inequality persists to much the same degree as before.  
 
Recent comparative research, using quasi cohorts drawn from the PISA and SAS surveys, 
estimates the life course changes in skills inequalities between the ages of 15 and 27, and 
suggests that upper secondary education and training mitigates skills inequality much less 
in England than in most other OECD countries which participated in both surveys (Green 
and Pensiero, 2015). Numeracy skills inequality actually increased substantially in 
England during this phase of education. The research also shows that relative failure in 
reducing skills inequality is associated across countries with systems which have a 
proliferation of different types of programme, of varying quality and duration, and which 
do not have a mandatory common core of learning in maths and the national language. All 
of this casts doubt on whether educational opportunities for current generation of youth 
are actually better than they were for their parents, thirty years before. In the following 
section, we examine the anatomy of the different pathways as they exist to today and 
consider how these different pathways are experienced by students themselves. 
 
Pathways in Post 16 Education and Training  
 
Upper secondary education in the UK has traditionally been understood to start at 16, after most 
students have complete their GCSEs (or previously O levels) and when they move into the Sixth 
Form or transfer to a Sixth Form College, or Further Education College. There are currently 
thousands of different qualifications which can be taken during this phase (Wolf, 2015), and 
different modes of studying each, but we can broadly distinguish between four main pathways 
corresponding to different levels of qualification. Annual data from the DFE (2015) gives the 
best estimates of the proportion of each age group studying at each level. The median age of 
students leaving upper secondary education and training is 17, so it is best to use this age group 
to identify the proportions following each pathway (even though some may have been in 
different pathways at 16). 
 
Two pathways constitute what may be called ‘full’ upper secondary education and training – 
that is the one that meets the OECD’s criteria for ISCED level 3 (long).  
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The ‘royal road’ remains the A level academic pathway which included 43 percent of 17 year 
olds in 2014, enrolled, normally full-time, either in sixth forms, Sixth Form Colleges or FE 
Colleges. Compared with other pathways this one has the clearest identity and is still the best 
known to the public and politicians. A levels are still considered the ‘gold standard’. Students 
taking this route tend to experience relatively smooth transitions from lower secondary 
education into upper secondary with progression paths thereafter as fairly linear and predictable. 
They tend to have clear goals, generally supported by high parental aspirations, and they tend 
to plan their routes towards achieving these goals. They possess relatively strong identities as 
students following an established and respected path, whose outcome is more or less predictable 
providing they work hard.   
 
In addition to the A level route – or sometimes combined with it - is the Level 3 vocational 
pathway which enrolled about 21 percent of 17 year olds in 2014. This pathway consists mainly 
of students studying full-time in sixth forms or colleges for qualifications such as the BTEC 
National Diploma, but it also includes a small proportion of apprentices and trainees taking 
Level 3 NVQs who enrolled in programmes organised by employers and private training 
organisations. Graduates from this pathway will progress either into higher education or go 
directly into the labour market. This type of upper secondary education and training lacks the 
clear identity of the A level route, not least because it includes such a plethora of qualifications 
and different ways of studying. Nevertheless, its more prestigious qualifications, such as the 
BTEC National Diploma, and some Level 3 NVQs, such as City and Guilds qualifications, are 
well known and students generally have a clear vocational orientation.  
Taken together, these two pathways account for the two thirds of young people, most of whom 
achieve qualifications which will allow progression to further study or career path jobs.  
 
There remains a third of young people who take other pathways which do not lead to level 3 
qualifications and offer much poorer prospects of progression into further education or career 
path jobs. These include those taking academic or vocational qualifications at level 2, such as 
GCSEs or BTEC Intermediates (together 8.1 percent of 17 year olds), who are mostly enrolled 
full-time in colleges, and a further 4.1 percent taking courses leading only to level 1 
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qualifications. A further 6.9 percent are classified as being in ‘work-based learning’, who are 
mostly on level 2 Apprenticeship programmes, and 7.5 percent in other private training. The 
majority of these two groups will not get qualifications above level 2. In addition to those above 
in education or training there were 5.4 percent of 17 year olds not in education, employment or 
training (NEET) and 3.6 percent who were employed but receiving no training. This group tends 
to move in an out of education and so cannot really be considered a discrete pathway. Students 
on these pathways tend to come from poorer families with more disrupted home lives and less 
parental support. Their goals are often not very clear and they often switch between different 
courses, or from a course to a job and then back to college, or in and out of education and 
NEETdom. Many courses were left unfinished and qualifications abandoned. For a few young 
people the route is a stepping stone up to a higher level education and training but for too many 
it represents an early and undistinguished exit from the education system.  
 
The likely labour market destinations of students on these three different pathways are very 
different.  
 
Almost all of those taking A levels and many taking general vocational programmes at level 3 
will now go into higher education or some form of tertiary education. For this group the 
employment prospects are still relatively good, although they may be declining in absolute 
terms. Tertiary educated adults are not all securing graduate jobs – in fact a recent analysis from 
the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development  (CIPD, 2015), based on European Social 
Survey data, suggests that between 2004 and 2010 58.8 percent of UK graduates were not in 
graduate jobs – the third highest rate after Greece and Estonia for all the countries in the survey. 
However, graduates still do considerably better on the labour market than those with lower level 
qualifications. OECD estimates for 2011 (OECD, 2013, Table A6.1) show that tertiary educated 
adults across the OECD countries earn 1.5 times as much as those with education only to upper 
secondary level. This wage premium applies to both tertiary Type A and tertiary Type B 
graduates. Men in OECD countries with Type B tertiary education earn on average 26 per cent 
more than those with only upper secondary education and women 32 percent more. Tertiary 
educated adults in the UK had a higher than average wage premium of 157 percent compared 
with upper secondary education adults. For most countries in the OCED these returns to tertiary 
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graduates held up during the 2000s, but in a few countries, including the UK, Canada and New 
Zealand, they have started to decline.   
 
Those on the higher vocational pathway will either go into tertiary education or enter the labour 
market directly and, in either case, are relatively better positioned to acquire good jobs than less 
qualified people. For those with a vocational level 3 qualification as their highest qualification 
the wage returns are positive on average but quite variable depending on the qualification. Using 
LFS data for 2007, Greenwood et al (2007) estimate that the wage return to those with NVQ 3s, 
compared to those with only level 2 qualifications, is 13 percent for males and 10 percent for 
females. The returns for City and Guilds level 3 qualifications are similar. However, some 
vocational level 3 qualifications, such as BTEC and ONC/OND, shower higher returns. A later 
study (BIS, 2010) finds average wage gains for holders of level 3 vocational qualifications, 
compared to similar individuals qualified only to level 2, of 10 percent for an NVQ level 3, 16 
percent for RSA level 3 and 20 per cent for a BTEC level 3.  
 
Level 2 vocational qualifications show much lower wage returns. Greenwood et al (2007) find 
that the return for those with NVQ 2 as their highest qualification, compared to those with only 
level one qualifications, is nil for males and only 3 percent for women, although BTEC, City 
and Guilds and RSA level 2 qualifications show somewhat higher returns. Likewise, the BIS 
study (2010) finds that the wage return for those with level 2 vocational  qualification, compared 
to similar individuals with qualifications below level 2, is 1 percent for those with NVQ Level 
2, 12 percent for those with BTEC level 2, and 16 percent for those with RSA level 2.  
 
Education and Jobs: The Declining Value of Qualifications on the Labour Market 
 
Like their parents generation, the current generation of youth are a far from homogenous group. 
Their lives are shaped by the different barriers and opportunities which they face according to 
their gender and ethnicity and social class background. This is reflected in the very different 
routes they take though an upper secondary education system in England which is exceptionally 
segmented (Green and Pensiero, 2015). Compared to their parents’ generation, all groups have, 
on average, received more years of schooling and gaining higher level qualifications but this 
does not necessarily translate in better job prospects.  
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Our own research comparing occupational destinations of people qualified to different levels in 
the mid 1980s and in the late 2000s, suggests that there has been a decline in the occupation 
status on average for people qualified at each level. Using data from the Labour Force Surveys, 
we looked at occupational destinations at 28-32 years of age by qualification level, in 1992 and 
2015. We took 28-32 years old since this is an age when most are likely to have reached a 
relatively stable career path, if they are going to at all. The 28-32 samples were divided into 
those with qualifications at five different levels: tertiary, upper secondary (NQF level 3), 
apprenticeship, lower secondary (NVQ level 2) and below Level 2. The Labour Force Survey 
allocates qualifications in much the same wat as the ISCED criteria used by the OECD. 
Apprenticeship is taken as a separate category because of the discontinuities in what constitutes 
a completed apprenticeship between the 1980s, when most apprenticeships led to a qualification 
equivalent to what today would be classified as level 3, and the 2000s when some 70 percent of 
apprentices only qualify at level 2.  We use a simple classification of occupational destinations 
into: 1) Professional and Managerial; 2) Associate Professional and Technical, 3) Clerical and 
Craft, and 4) Semi- and Unskilled (see appendix). For reporting purposes here we combine 1) 
and 2) into a single category of ‘graduate jobs’. The full tables can be found in the appendix. 
 
Our analysis shows that amongst 28-32 year olds at all levels of qualification occupational status 
declined overall between 1992 and 2015. This is most evident in the proportion of those 
qualified to each level who find themselves in semi- and unskilled jobs at age 28-32. The 
proportion rose between 1992 and 2015 from 8.5 percent to 14.7 for graduates; from 21.9 
percent to 32.9 percent for those qualified to upper secondary level; and from 28 to 34.3 percent 
for those with completed apprenticeships. Across these groups, an increasing proportion found 
themselves employed below their level of qualification and skill during this period. For those 
qualified at the lowest level, the proportion in low skilled jobs at 28-32 years also rose, from 
26.6 percent to 33.8 percent, suggesting that over time fewer of these had been able to progress 
to jobs beyond their initial qualification levels.  
 
Growing rates of over-qualification and under-employment are most evident amongst graduates. 
Whereas 68.8 percent of graduates in 1992 progressed into ‘graduate jobs’ by age 28-32, only 
62.7 percent did so in 2015. Of those who did not, a larger proportion now found themselves in 
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craft and clerical jobs (12.1 compared to 9.2 percent), and a much larger proportion than before 
were in semi- and unskilled jobs (14.7 compared to 8.5 percent). The trend amongst those with 
highest qualification at upper secondary level is slightly more complex. A slightly larger 
proportion in 2015 (26.8 percent) than in 1992 (24.5 percent) had progressed to graduate jobs, 
perhaps because of the rapid expansion of jobs classified as ‘associate professional’, and fewer 
were in craft and clerical jobs (25.3 compared to 33.4 percent), but the major shift was in the 
substantial rise in the proportion finding themselves in low skilled jobs (from 21.9 percent in 
1992 to 32.9 percent in 2015). The average occupational status of apprentices has also declined 
overall during the period. Considerably fewer apprentices are now progressing beyond their 
qualification level (from 13.5 percent to 8.6 per cent) and more end up in semi- and unskilled 
jobs (from 28 percent to 34.3 percent), but this does not necessarily represent an increase in 
‘under-employment’ since fewer of the recent apprentices will have reached a level 3 
qualification level than in the 1990s. Also fewer of the former apprentices were now 
unemployed or inactive (from 22.1 to 12.2 percent). Amongst the least qualified (those with 
below level 2) slightly more found their way into graduate jobs than before (19.6 from 17.4 
percent ) and fewer were unemployed or inactive (from 45.7 to 25.1 percent), the latter trend 
probably reflecting the increasing proportion of lower qualified women now working, albeit that 
many of these would be in part-time jobs.6  But more than before were were now in semi- and 
unskilled jobs (from 26.6 percent to 33.8 percent).  
 
These inter-generational changes in labour market outcomes for people qualified at different 
levels are quite substantial but they probably under-estimate the real decline in labour market 
opportunities for young people today for two reasons. Firstly, the sample aged 28-32 are would 
mostly have entered the labour market before the financial crash of 2008, when conditions were 
better. Secondly, since the LFS records all those working at least one our a week as employed, 
the employment figures mask the increasing incidence of part-time working amongst young 
people, many of whom would wish to be full time jobs. While the proportion of female 
employees working less than 30 hours per week has remained quite stable, the proportion of 
male employees working part-time rose from 2 percent in 1986 to 9 percent in 2012 (Felstead 
et al, 2015), and the rise may be higher for young workers.  
                                                          
6 Around 40 of all female employees are in jobs with less than 30 hours per seek (Felstead et al, 2015).  
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Conclusions 
 
How can we summarise the intergenerational balance sheet in England on opportunities for 
young people in and through education? Opportunities to study for young people today are 
certainly much better than they were for their parents’ generation. The is greater diversity in the 
types of course on offer and more support from Governments for young people to take up these 
opportunities. Consequently young people have better qualifications that their parents had and 
inequality of opportunities and outcomes for qualifications appear to have reduced, particularly 
at the upper secondary level. For many young people, and particularly for young women and 
for those from immigrant families whose parents had very few educational opportunities in their 
countries of birth, this is perceived as a genuine improvement in opportunities over the 
generation.  
However, in terms of future life chances this is something of a mirage. In the first place, while 
young people are better qualified and have a broader education than their parents had in many 
respects, in terms of competences in basic skills they fare no fare no better than their parents 
and inequalities of opportunities for these skills are now higher than they were. Education is, of 
course,  not only about developing literacy and numeracy, but these skills do matter, and 
increasingly so in our digital age. Skills in numeracy are still one of the best predictors of future 
earnings (OECD ref). In the second place, it is clear that better qualifications amongst today’s 
generation of youth are not necessarily translating into better job prospects. This probably has 
more to do with changes in the labour market, than with the skills of young people themselves, 
even though the latter, in terms of literacy and numeracy at least, may have improved less than 
one would have wished.   
Over the life course of today’s youth, it is likely that those who are best qualified will attain 
occupational positions and earnings comparable to similarly qualified people in their parent’s 
generation. However, the least qualified and most vulnerable on the labour market, and 
particularly those without a level 3 qualifications, will almost certainly fair worse than their 
equivalents in the parental generation. So in life course terms it is likely that there will have 
been an overall increase in inequalities in socio-economic opportunities by educational levels 
amongst this generation compared with their parents’ generation.  
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Appendix 
Occupational  destinations by level of qualifications: 28-32 years 1992 
  
Professional 
& 
Managerial 
Associate 
Professional 
and 
Technical 
Clerical 
and 
Craft 
Semi & 
Unskilled 
& Other Unemployed Inactive Missing 
Total % In 
each 
qualification 
Level 
Tertiary 42.7% 26.1% 9.2% 8.5% 3.3% 8.9% 1.2% 20.50% 
Upper 
Secondary 
16.4% 8.1% 33.4% 21.9% 7.7% 11.1% 1.4% 21.20% 
Apprenticeship 8.5% 5.0% 35.2% 28.0% 10.8% 11.3% 1.3% 5.30% 
Lower 
Secondary 
13.1% 4.3% 28.4% 26.6% 6.0% 20.4% 1.1% 21.70% 
Below Level 2 4.4% 1.0% 15.8% 31.7% 13.1% 32.6% 1.4% 28.10% 
Other 
Qualifications 9.8% 4.6% 14.8% 37.4% 10.7% 21.9% 0.8% 3.00% 
Missing 0.0% 5.3% 21.1% 31.6% 10.5% 15.8% 15.8% 0.20% 
Total % In 
each 
occupational 
category  
17.1% 8.7% 21.9% 23.7% 8.2% 19.1% 1.3% 12167 
Occupational  destinations by level of qualifications: 28-32 years 2015 
  
Professional 
& 
Managerial 
Associate 
Professional 
and 
Technical 
Clerical 
and 
Craft 
Semi & 
Unskilled 
& Other Unemployed Inactive Missing 
Total % In 
each 
qualification 
Level 
Tertiary 44.5% 18.2% 12.1% 14.7% 1.8% 8.6% 0.1% 44.70% 
Upper 
Secondary 
11.7% 15.1% 25.3% 32.9% 3.1% 11.6% 0.3% 16.30% 
Apprenticeship 5.7% 2.9% 45.0% 34.3% 4.3% 7.9% 0.0% 2.30% 
Lower 
Secondary 
8.2% 11.4% 21.1% 33.8% 5.7% 19.4% 0.5% 14.60% 
Below Level 2 4.5% 4.8% 13.2% 38.2% 7.9% 30.8% 0.6% 14.50% 
Other 
Qualifications 
5.3% 2.8% 21.7% 45.0% 4.2% 20.1% 0.9% 7.20% 
Missing 9.1% 13.6% 13.6% 9.1% 4.5% 36.4% 13.6% 0.40% 
Total % In 
each 
occupational 
category  
24.2% 13.3% 17.2% 26.5% 3.7% 14.8% 0.4% 5983 
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